Shifting Geopolitics in the Horn of Africa and Implications on Kenya’s National Security

Resurgent ethnic nationalism shaping geopolitics in the horn

Saturday, November 10, 2018

Daily Nation

In an enthralling article, “Us and them: The enduring power of ethnic nationalism”, Jerry Muller has argued that although we generally tend to belittle the role of ethnic nationalism in politics, “it will drive global politics for generations to come”.

The rise of Abiy Ahmed Ali (42) as Prime Minister of Ethiopia on April 2, 2018 and his bold move to open up Ethiopia to political reforms and to end hostilities with Eritrea heralded an era of peace in the turbulent Horn of Africa.

NEW AXIS

But the ascendancy of the first-ever ethnic Oromo to the helm of the Ethiopian state in modern times is fuelling ethnic nationalism and putting a sharp focus on the Oromo people as the centrepiece of an imagined Oromo-Somali ‘Cushitic Alliance’ as a new axis in the Horn of Africa politics.

GEOPOLITICS

The numbers and wide geographical spread of the Oromo, the largest ethnic group in the Horn of Africa, has put them at the apex of this residual nationalism. By 2015, the Oromo, and an Afro-Asiatic linguistic group in the Horn of Africa, represented 34.5 percent (over 40 million) of Ethiopia’s population, half a million people in Kenya and 42,000 in Somalia.

Prompters of the Oromo-Somali ‘Cushitic Alliance’ are seeking to replace the old geopolitical alliances based on the nation-state, which before April 2018 seemed to rest on a sturdy ‘Bantu-Amhara Alliance’.

ASIATIC POWER

Before the 1935, Italian occupation, Ethiopia always imagined itself as an ‘Asiatic power’, and not an African empire. But Fascist Italy’s brutal conquest and Haile Selassie’s own humbling exile in England (1936-40) transformed Ethiopia into a symbol of African nationalism.

As Jeremy Murray-Brown noted in his biography, Kenyatta: A Biography, in 1931 Mzee Jomo Kenyatta had kept the red, green and gold Ethiopian flag in his room at 75 Castle Road England commemorating a year after Haile Selassie was crowned Emperor having resisted colonisation by Fascist Italy.

FIGHTER JETS

In exile, Emperor Haile Selassie met Kenyatta and other pan-Africanists. After independence, Kenyatta invited the Emperor during the Jamhuri Day celebrations in June 1964, and named ‘Haile Selassie Avenue’ in the honour of his Ethiopian friend.

Notably, in his 15-year presidency, Kenyatta made only two foreign trips: one to England in July 1964 and the other to Ethiopia where fighter jets formed the name ‘JOMO’ on the sky in 1969! Haile Selassie also hived off a prime piece of land next to the British Embassy, allocating it to the Kenyan Embassy in Addis Ababa.

WARFARE

However, the ‘Bantu-Amhara Alliance moved to a new concrete level on December 27, 1963 following the signing of the Kenya-Ethiopia Mutual Defence to contain Somalia’s expansionist ambitions in the Horn of Africa by annexing Ethiopia’s Ogaden region, Kenya’s North-Eastern District and Djibouti.

At the heart of ethnic nationalism in the Horn of Africa is the long and vexed history of accords and discords involving the “highlanders” (Bantu-Amhara) and the “lowlanders” (Oromo and Somali) in the Horn of Africa. Pan-Somali ethnic nationalism propelled by Somalia’s territorial claims against its neighbours led to four wars with Ethiopia: the 1960-1964 Border War; the 1977-1978 Ogaden War; the 1982 border clash and the 1998-2000 cross-border warfare during the turbulent era of warlords.

CUSHITIC ALLIANCE

It also contributed to the Somali Secessionist War (Shifta war) in Northern Kenya (1963-1968) and, to a great extent, the Djiboutian Civil War (1991-1994).

Today, a mix of Islamism and pan-Somali nationalism are also driving Al-Shabaab’s war against its neighbours and Internationally-backed Federal Government of Somalia in Mogadishu.

More broadly, proponents of the ‘Cushitic Alliance’ see the rise of Abiy as a return to the glorious years of Oromo power from the 18th century to the 19th century when they were the dominant influence in Ethiopia.

US-VERSUS-THEM

In this configuration, the African Mission in Somalia (Amisom) fighting against the Al-Shabaab is redefined as part of the “Bantu-Amhara” military offensive involving mainly Kenya, Uganda, Burundi, Djiobouti and Ethiopia (before April).

Publicity of the Oromo-Somali Cushitic Axis has been kept low and out of the diplomatic purview. But paradoxically, it is the Eritreans, themselves “highlanders”, who are the theorists and prime movers of the idea. The us-versus-them Bantu-Cushitic divide is based on the logic that “the enemy of my enemy is a potential friend”.

ISOLATION

President Isaias Afwerki and his Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) have always blamed former Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi’s Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and the Amhara Democratic Party (ADP) within the EPRDF for the Eritrean — Ethiopian War (1998- 2000) and Eritrea’s subsequent isolation.

Isaias has seized his détente with Abiy, as the leader of the Oromo Democratic Party (ODP) and chairman of Ethiopia’s ruling Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), as an opportunity to vanquish and isolate his foes in Ethiopia. He has carefully wafted the idea of a Cushitic Alliance through a flurry of tri-lateral meetings with Abiy and Mohamed Abdullahi “Farmajo” of Somalia.

FRICTION

Geopolitical rivalries involving the Gulf States are adding a dangerous twist to the new politics of difference. In its recent report titled, “The United Arab Emirates in the Horn of Africa” (November 6, 2018), the Belgium-based think tank, the International Crisis Group, highlights the contradictory role of the Gulf states in the Horn of Africa.

While the diplomacy and aid of the UAE and Saudi Arabia, were pivotal in the peace agreement that normalised the Eritrea-Ethiopia relations, competition with Qatar and Turkey has aggravated friction between Mogadishu and Somali regional leaders.

RECOVERY PLAN

The less ideological technocratic wing of the Somalia Government is looking to Kenya and Ethiopia to soar its economic recovery plan. Alliances based on recidivistic nationalism can only undermine the war on Al-Shabaab and Somalia’s recovery

Tracing the emergence of Eritrea as the Horn’s biggest strategic power

Sunday, August 01, 2021

Daily Nation

Ethiopia has in recent years emerged as the most influential strategic actor in the Horn. Since 2018, the Horn’s second smallest state after Djibouti has been the giant spider weaving the web of geopolitics in the region, with an inordinately huge geo-strategic influence, especially over Ethiopia and Somalia. 

After independence in 1993, Eritrea started off with strong democratic aspirations. This was clear from a speech titled ‘Democracy in Africa: an African view’ that President Isaias Afwerki, the country’s sole ruler since independence, delivered at the Walton Park Conference in West Sussex, England, on September 8, 1997. Afwerki extolled democracy and the rule of law as essential pillars of a modern society.

Today, experts concur that Eritrea is Africa’s “most fiercely authoritarian state”. It is training the armies of allies, intervening in wars and supporting the agenda of dismantling federalism and centralising power through intense militarism. 

One of Africa’s most centralised states, Eritrea has not held any elections since independence. Elections have been postponed indefinitely since the 1998-2000 border war with Ethiopia. Its national assembly last met in 2002. President Afwerki, a consummate and ruthless strategist, holds both the executive and legislative powers. His ruling People’s Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ) is the only legal political party.

Prior to June 2018, Eritrea was a regional pariah state at war with all its neighbours. From December 15 to December 17, 1995, it fought a three-day war with Yemen over the island of Greater Hanish. In 1998, the Permanent Court of Arbitration ruled that most of the archipelago was in Yemen.

Between May 1998 and June 2000, it fought with Ethiopia over the barren border territory around Badme, which resulted in a 20-year stalemate and proxy wars. In December 2009, the UN Security Council imposed sanctions after it emerged Asmara was supporting al-Shabaab militants in Somalia as part of its proxy war with Ethiopia. In June 2008, Eritrean forces penetrated Djibouti, sparking a brief border conflict with its neighbour.

A historic peace pact with Ethiopia in July 2018 changed the fortunes of Eritrea’s diplomacy. On June 5, 2018, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed agreed to fully implement a peace treaty signed with Eritrea in 2000 and the two sealed a new one in July. This ended two decades of a “frozen war” with Ethiopia. Many expected Eritrea to reap the peace dividends and open up its closed political system and resume polls, but that was not to be . 

Eritrea’s post-2018 strategy in the Horn is weaved around a Tripartite Alliance with Ethiopia and Somalia, known the New Horn Cooperation, which was unveiled in 2019. The alliance was to be based on a ‘Cushitic consciousness’ that aspired to unite Somali and Oromo as two Cushitic communities.

Afwerki strategically positioned the new alliance as an alternative to the exiting security architecture in the Horn based on the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (Igad). 

Longevity of allied regimes 

Eritrea has also been pursuing an agenda of centralisation to secure the survival and longevity of allied regimes. However, the emergence of a rival regional security architecture as a new alternative centre of power has thrown the region into turmoil.

A contrived delay of scheduled elections and term extension plunged Somalia into its worst constitutional crisis, pushed the country to the brink of civil war, emboldened al-Shabaab terrorists and undermined counter-terrorism efforts.

Similarly, in Ethiopia, postponement of elections and extension of the regime’s stay in office shattered democratic transition and triggered the deadly conflict in Tigray.

The Horn of Africa Cooperation has now turned into a military alliance. Reports indicate that since 2019, Eritrea has clandestinely trained between 3,000 and 7,000 special troops in support of Afwerki’s ally, President Farmaajo.  The issue of training Somali recruits in Eritrea initially featured in talks during Farmaajo’s visit to Asmara in September 2018. 

Eritrea has defended the project as its way of returning the favour for Somalia’s support during its liberation struggle. In January 2021, Mogadishu’s information minister Osman Abukar Dubbe admitted Asmara has been training Somali troops.

While similar training of Somali soldiers abroad, including in Turkey, Uganda and Djibouti have been coordinated by the Ministry of Defence, the Eritrean operation was under Somalia’s National Intelligence Agency (Nisa).

Somalia’s Federal member states expressed fear that the troops trained by Eritrea were Farmaajo’s personal force that could be used in election-related conflicts in Somalia.

Stoking this fear, Farmaajo has been pushing for Eritrean soldiers to replace the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) in the African Union Mission to Somalia (Amisom) in Jubaland. Villa Somalia was also courting Eritrea and Turkey to replace the African peacekeepers under Amisom, when they finally withdraw in 2021.

Eritrea has also intervened militarily in Ethiopia in support of its ally, Prime Minister Abiy. In hindsight, the 2018 peace pact between Afwerki and Abiy could in reality have been an Ethiopia-Eritrea military pact against a common enemy – the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF).  This came as a dispute over the postponement of elections in Ethiopia slated for August 9, 2020 continued.

Social media reports suggested Eritrea-trained Somali soldiers were fighting alongside Eritrean forces in Tigray, with Somalia dismissing the reports as “unfounded rumours”. For the sake of democracy and stability in the Horn, Eritrea should withdrawal its troops from Ethiopia.

Once a pariah, Eritrean president comes up with regional bloc idea  

Sunday, February 02, 2020

Nation Media Group

Isaias Afwerki, the mustachioed Eritrean president, is not usually known for regional integration.

Critics of the revolutionary who led his country to independence accuse him of dictatorship, a charge he denies.

For the past two years, though, Afwerki’s traits appear to be changing.

Even the UN, which had imposed sanctions on his regime, lifted them in 2018. Afwerki mended fences with Ethiopia following two decades of hostilities.

This week, he hosted Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and Mohamed Farmajo, the president of Somalia.

It was the third time Afwerki was meeting the two since January 2019. He had also met Abiy during the signing of the historic peace deal in 2018.

Last year, Abiy won the Nobel Peace Prize for that effort, and many asked what was in store for Afwerki.

INFLUENCE

Some analysts told the Nation that the recent meeting points to where Afwerki’s prize is: influence in the Horn of Africa.

After the tripartite summit, Eritrea’s Information Minister Yemane Meskel tweeted that the leaders adopted a joint action plan for 2020.

The plan, he said, would focus “on two main and intertwined objectives of consolidating peace, stability and security as well as promoting economic and social development”.

“They also agreed to bolster efforts for effective regional co-operation,” he said.

A later dispatch said the three leaders would focus on development, mobilise human and material resources and build infrastructure.

That ambition is to lead to some sort of Horn of Africa coalition, which some analysts said would be called a Cushitic Alliance (based on the languages predominantly spoken in the three countries).

STRUGGLE

To be fair, the countries have faced civil strife or terrorism in the past three decades.

But as they stabilise, hunger, poverty, human trafficking and unemployment continue to face them.

Yet it is Afwerki who is the eldest and most experienced of the three.

As head of the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front, he led his country to independence from Ethiopia in war victory in the early 1990s.

But Afwerki hoarded power and feuded with Ethiopia, Djibouti and Yemen over boundaries.

He also boycotted Intergovernmental Authority on development (Igad) meetings, earning Eritrea the title of a pariah state.

“When Abiy won the Nobel, Afwerki seemed to be in his shadow. But he was always constrained by the isolation,” said Dr Patrick Maluki, a diplomacy lecturer at the University of Nairobi.

“He wanted to control the region. This bloc idea seems to be his project, but we can only wait and see. He is the most experienced of the three, so it would be expected that he wants to assert himself.”

CRITICISM

Critics were quick to accuse the three leaders of opportunism.

Somali Senator Ilyas Ali Hassan said the proposals could be illegal unless parliaments endorse them.

But he argued that Eritrea and Ethiopia have in the past contributed to instability in Somalia.

“Without solving the problems Somalia faces, how can you jump into a strategic relationship? Nobody understands what these leaders are discussing,” he told the Sunday Nation.

They need to bring the proposals to parliament and speak to the public. Somalia has neighbours that have helped it better than these two. What have they done better that Djibouti and Kenya, for example?” he asked.

The delegations of both leaders spoke of a strong link to security and economic affairs.

Somalia had Mr Abdi Ashir Hassen, minister of post, telecommunications and technology as well as foreign policy adviser to President Nur Dire Hersi.

Ethiopia had Defence Minister Lemma Megersa on board.

EXPANSION

The leaders said they could expand the bloc by talking to “our friends and partners on the basis of mutual respect and benefit”.

“They can form a strong economic bloc, especially now that Eritrea and Ethiopia are together. It is a strategic ambition,” said Macharia Munene, professor of history and international relations at USIU-Africa.

“Ethiopia wants access to the sea … and once it gets that, it will have diversified from reliance on Djibouti.”

Except, there are risks. For long Igad was dominated by Kenya and Ethiopia, as Eritrea sat on the fence, protesting its set-up.

Prof Munene says Igad’s vision of dealing with security crises has been hampered by infighting. A new bloc could kill it, he says.

Power shift in the Horn of Africa is eroding Kenya’s influence

Saturday, June 15, 2019

Nation Media Group

At the dawn of this century, the then editor of the Foreign Affairs Journal, James Fulton Hoge Jr., rightly observed that the global “transfer of power from West to East” was “dramatically changing the context for dealing with international challenges—as well as the challenges themselves” (Foreign Affairs, July/August, 2004).

MESSIANIC SENSE

In the Horn of Africa, the return to peace and collapse of sit-tight dictatorial regimes is spawning a major power shift.

It is also challenging Kenya’s influence in the region over the last five decades in a profound and palpable way.

The old regional balance of power that sustained Kenya’s regional influence rested on three pillars. One was a Strategic Alliance, a mutual defence pact ratified by the two countries in December 1963, with scions of the Solomonic Dynasty. The Kenya-Ethiopia Defence pact, which sought to curb the territorial and power ambitions of an increasingly militaristic and expansionist Somalia, ensured that Kenya and Ethiopia coexisted and collaborated in a duality of power as two regional powers with little competition for legitimacy or influence.

Second, this duality of power has rested on the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) established in 1996. Third, the Ethiopia-Kenya duality of power within IGAD gave the two powers a huge influence in the African Union and its Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). This enabled them to sustain the African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) that has waged war against the terrorism in Somalia.

Sadly, this old regional security regime appears to be falling apart. The relative peace that has followed the end of civil wars in Ethiopia and Somalia in recent decades coupled with the thawing of historic power rivalries especially between Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia has shifted the axis of power to new alliances.

Power is gradually shifting to Eritrea and its allies in post-civil war Ethiopia and Somalia. Having emerged from the ashes of a long war of Independence against Ethiopia from 1961-1991, Eritrea is one of the few surviving nationalist and revolutionary regimes in Africa. It has a messianic sense of itself in the Ethiopia state, claiming a special contribution to ending the Ethiopia civil war and securing the post-bellum power.

ETHNIC SUPRMACIST

After defeating the Ethiopian forces in Eritrea, the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) helped the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), a coalition of Ethiopian rebel forces, to capture Addis Ababa and install a transitional government 1991. However, although Eritrea declared its independence and gained international recognition in 1993, supremacy wars and hostilities between EPRDF and EPLF sparked the Eritrean–Ethiopian War (1998–2000), a low-intensity border conflict (2000–2018) and complex proxy wars.

Three developments have shifted the axis of power in favour of a resurgent Ethio-Eritrea détente. One is the rise of Abiy Ahmed Ali as Prime Minister in Ethiopia and EPRDF leader on April 2, 2018 which paved the way for two powerful allies in the Ethiopian Civil War to join ranks in regional power politics.

Second, and related to this, on July 9, Afwerki and Abiy signed the historic 2018 Eritrea–Ethiopia peace pact, formally ending the border conflict, hostilities and proxy wars between the two countries, restoring full diplomatic relations.

Third, the election of Mohamed Abdullahi (Farmajo) as the President of Somalia in 2017, heralded the resurgence of ethnic supremacist politics inside Somalia and pan-Somali nationalism as the organising principle in Somalia’s regional relations.

After July 2018, Farmajo joined Afwerki and Abiy with the idea of a New Horn as the tie that binds the trio. The removal of long-time Sudanese strongman Omar El-Bashir on April 11, 2019 has left Afwerki as the senior-most leader and, arguably, the most influential figure shaping politics in the Horn of Africa. In a rare case where authoritarianism is aiding and securing liberal reforms, Afwerki’s Eritrea, touted in the media as “Africa’s North Korea”, is the guarantor of stability in Ethiopia.

TRIPLE DETENTE

Here, Abiy’s sweeping political and economic reforms have their discontents, especially Ethiopian Federalists and the Tigrayans—the ethnic partners in EPRDF who now feel that Abiy’s shake-up of the Ethiopian state is selectively targeting the Tigrayans.

Be that as it may, as power shifts to the triple détente in the ‘New Horn’, the future of Kenya’s influence as a regional peacemaker and guarantor of stability is coming into sharp focus.

The rise of the idea of the New Horn, largely hoisted on a pan-ethnic idea of “Cushitic Alliance” (Oromo and Somalis), has posed an existential ideological challenge to IGAD and the regional consensus it represents.

Second, Ethiopia and Eritrea—with its large fighting force remnants from its war with Ethiopia—are seeking a new role as a military ally to Farmajo. This raises serious questions regarding the future of AMISOM, especially its contingents from Kenya, Uganda, Djibouti and Burudi and the very war against Al-Shabaab terrorists.

Third, since the coming to power of Abiy (42), Ethiopia has enhanced its regional soft power, seemingly eclipsing Kenya as the lone regional peacemaker.

In the wake of the brutal crackdown on protesters in Sudan which left dozens of people killed on June 3, 2019, Ethiopia has stepped up its peace diplomacy. Indeed, Ethiopia has also moved to broker peace between Kenya and Somalia over the simmering maritime row.

Finally, and related to the above, power shift in the Horn has emboldened Somalia in its claim over Kenyan waters in what is unfolding as an existential challenge to the country.

Should the ICJ rule in favour of Somalia in the coming months, experts fret that Kenya will loose not only 62,000 square kilometres of its Indian Ocean waters.

It also risks losing access to international waters, effectively becoming a ‘land-locked’ country.

Kenya and Egypt sign defence cooperation agreement

Wednesday, May 26, 2021

Nation Media Group

Kenya on Wednesday signed a defence cooperation agreement with Egypt, seeking to enhance their military relations in combating common security problems.

Defence Cabinet Secretary, Dr Monica Juma, who signed the agreement on behalf of Kenya, said it will help both countries pursue “partnership in matters of mutual benefit”.

Egyptian Chief of Staff, Lt-Gen Mohamed Farid Hegazy, signed the agreement for his country after holding talks with Dr Juma and Kenya’s Chief of Defence Forces, Gen Robert Kibochi, in Nairobi.

Though details of the agreement were not made public, a defence cooperation with Kenya means Egypt has reached similar arrangements with Sudan, Uganda and Burundi and has been in talks with South Sudan.

Nile Basin states
All these countries have the distinction of being in the Nile Basin, either as sources of riparian states for the Nile, which Ethiopia relies on almost 100 per cent for fresh water.

Egypt has bickered recently with Ethiopia, which is the source of most of the Nile waters, on the mode of filling the Grand Renaissance Dam on the Blue Nile. Cairo argued the filling, without an agreement, threatens its national security and source of water. On the other hand, Ethiopia, which dismisses the fears raised by Cairo, says it will not withhold water, and that it has sovereign rights to use the water.

In the wake of the dispute, both countries have recently engaged in shuttle diplomacy involving all riparian countries.

Egypt has since reached military cooperation agreements with various countries, which analysts think are all linked to preventing any sort of military coalition against it.

Isolating Ethiopia
“It is clear as day they are isolating Ethiopia with a view to military action,” argued Paul Olind, an analyst on the Nile politics.

“It is, however, not inevitable but the timing has to be rather tempting to Cairo given [Prime Minister] Abiy Ahmed’s issues,” he said referring to the internal political crisis in Tigray, border dispute with Sudan as well as imminent elections due next month, the first electoral test for Abiy as head of government.

Kenya has, however, maintained a principle of strategic neutrality and has an age-old mutual defence pact with Ethiopia which it signed during the days of Emperor Haile Selassie.

Nairobi, one diplomat told the Nation, believes that a discussion can yield an amicable solution to the sharing of the Nile, making it needless to pick on the military option.

“There are two issues; no one country can claim an entire share of the water. But we have to be realistic because the demands for water in our countries have risen significantly,” the official told the Nation.

Get mutual solution
“So it is prudent that people sit down and agree on a mutual solution, based on this reality. We don’t see any problem here.”

Ethiopia has insisted on the use of African Union mechanisms to resolve the dispute, which has already gone various rounds without a solution. Egypt has suggested that the UN be involved.

Dr Rashid Abdi, a Kenyan analyst on the Horn of Africa, argues that the visits by the Egyptian army chief signal Cairo’s continued strategy to ring-fence its Nile strategy, and that a defence cooperation strategy should be seen as a sign of growing ties.

“Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah al-Sissi will be in Djibouti this week to meet with [President Ismail] Guelleh. This will complete Cairo’s strategic ring of influence in the Horn.

“Cairo has outflanked and outmanoeuvred Ethiopia. Addis is set on July filling of the GERD,” he wrote on his Twitter page on Wednesday.

Turkey sets its sights on the Horn of Africa

DW

2020

Turkey is building on its already-strong relationship with Somalia as it accepts an invitation to explore for oil in its seas. Ankara has spent years building trust in the region as it seeks to increase its influence.

Turkey’s influence in the Horn of Africa is back in the spotlight, following the announcement that Somalia has invited Turkey to explore for oil in its seas.

The invitation was preceded by a maritime agreement Turkey signed with Libya last year, which increased tensions in the Mediterranean over energy resources.

“This is an offer from Somalia,” said Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. “They are saying: ‘There is oil in our seas. You are carrying out these operations in Libya, but you can also do them here.’ This is very important for us.”

Erdogan did not elaborate as to how Turkey plans to follow-up on Somalia’s offer.

Last October the Somali Minister of Petroleum, Abdirashid Mohamed Ahmed, announced that the country was opening up 15 blocks for oil companies to bid on.

Economic and security developments in the wider Horn of Africa region have boosted the area’s significance as a geostrategic location in recent years. Turkey’s presence has sparked interest from analysts examining its motivations and Gulf States seeking to expand their influence.

Turkish Chief of Staff, General Hulusi Akar and Somali Prime Minister Hassan Ali Khayre tour a newly-opened Turkey-Somali training center in 2017. Turkey has continued to provide military support in Somalia, including training soldiers

Building ‘channels of trust’

Turkey’s close relationship with Somalia is nothing new. It has been a major source of aid to Somalia ever since 2011 when Erdogan visited the famine-gripped country.

What started out as a humanitarian policy grew more complex over time: Soon, Turkey was increasing its aid, founding new development projects and even getting involved in the post-conflict state-building process, becoming one of the first states to resume formal diplomatic relations with Somalia after the civil war, as well as the first to resume flights into Mogadishu. Today, Turkish companies still manage Mogadishu’s main seaport, airport and even provide military training for Somali government soldiers.

“In the case of Turkey and Somalia’s relationship, it has been largely ‘win-win’,” Brendon Cannon, an academic who specializes in external power and their interactions with the Horn of Africa, told DW. “It’s developed rather quickly into an economic relationship. This was helped by Ankara’s direct cash payments to Somalia’s federal government, as well as winning major contracts for infrastructure [projects] in Mogadishu.” 

Compared to other international actors, particularly western states, Turkey has sought to build and maintain a sense of trust with Somalia, explains conflict studies professor, Doga Erlap.

“For the past ten years, Turkey has been building channels of trust between Somalia and Ankara,” he told DW. “Turkey is not as wary [regarding issues of security and transparency] compared to the West, putting Turkey a couple of steps ahead of other international ‘bidders’ who may also seek offshore drilling rights in Somalia.”

Horn of Africa a ‘bright spot’

However, what some interpret to be an increasingly assertive and dynamic African foreign policy is more a result of domestic policies.

“Turkey’s primary motivation is domestic at the end of the day. So as a G20 member and as a firm middle power, Ankara — particularly the Ankara ruled by Erdogan — has actively attempted to further Turkish influence in areas outside its normal purview. The Horn of Africa is a particular bright spot in this case, given Turkey’s successes there.”

Erlap says that while Turkey’s global ambitions of becoming a regional hegemon — and reviving its presence in former Ottoman regions — is part of the reason for its interest, energy is the primary driving factor behind Turkey’s decision to maintain its ties to the Horn of Africa, owing to it need for accessible resources.

“The Turkish economy is in a complete shambles right now. So the government desperately needs access to energy resources — one of which is the offshore oil in Somalia.”

Overstating Turkey’s influence

But although much has been said of Turkey’s influence in the Horn of Africa — especially Somalia —some observers are still wary of overstating its influence in the region.

“Like all countries, Turkey has limits to its ability to project power in either a soft or hard form,” Cannon says. “It’s going to maintain resources close to home in the Mediterranean world.”

Turkey has also set its sights on Sudan, where it says it seeks to maintain what Erdogan has described as “deep-rooted relations,” as the war-torn nation begins the long process of rebuilding its state institutions.

“It’s still unclear what Ankara’s interests are with the new government in Sudan and how it’s attempting to sway it one way or another,” says Cannon. “Whether it can compete with what appear to be basically common interests between the Gulf States and Washington and the UK at this point, I don’t believe it stands a chance of being able to do as much.”

Saudi Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir (L), UAE Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed al-Nahyan (C-L), Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry (C-R), and Bahraini Foreign Minister Khalid bin Ahmed al-Khalifa in a meeting. The Gulf States are also expanding their influence in the Horn of Africa

Could tensions in the Gulf lead to increased instability in the Horn?

Turkey’s influence in the Horn of Africa has also been interpreted as a method of countering powerful Gulf rivals such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

Since 2017, the Gulf crisis has seen Turkey and its ally Qatar pitted against regional heavyweights Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain. Given Somalia’s history as an unstable state and its strategic location along the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, which links the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean, it has been used as catalyst of sorts for the regional ambitions of Gulf States. The UAE has accused Somalia of siding with Qatar, while Somalia has also accused the UAE of threatening Somalia’s stability by supporting breakaway state, Somaliland — where it originally planned to build a military airport.

With the feud showing no signs of resolution any time soon, could it possibly spill over in the Horn of Africa as a proxy conflict?

“It could really exacerbate regional and local issues within Somalia itself and then moving across the Horn,” says Cannon. “What Turkey and other external states are doing is not engendering conflict, they’re exacerbating existing fault lines for conflict, and therein lies the trouble.”

Maritime dispute still to be resolved

Somalia’s recent offer to Turkey also risks pulling them into direct conflict with neighboring Horn states such as Kenya, as the oil blocks in question are in the disputed maritime zone — a long-running quarrel which is yet to be resolved in the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The disputed area is approximately 100,000 square kilometers and is thought to contain significant deposits of oil and gas.

While Turkey has been able to focus on development and construction in Somalia without coming to direct conflict with other states in the region, its involvement in securing offshore oil reserves may complicate matters.

“Turkey getting involved in oil blocks and International Court of Justice rulings at this point may bring it into a zone that it doesn’t want to be in,” says Cannon.

Turkey’s growing influence in the Horn of Africa

24 March, 2021

The New Arab

Analysis: In the last decade, Turkey has moved from being a peripheral country with little presence in the Horn of Africa to one of the region’s most indispensable partners.

Turkey has increased its profile considerably in East Africa over the past decade. [Getty]The skylines of Djibouti and Mogadishu, two vibrant port cities in the Horn of Africa, are today bedecked by the minarets and domes of Turkish built Ottoman style grand mosques.  

Completed in the last decade, the two mosques signal Ankara’s interest in cultivating relations with East African countries and ensuring its visibility in a region where Turkey has considerably increased its profile in the last decade. 

Turkey distinguishes itself from Africa’s European, Chinese and American partners through its shared religious identity with the region, says Ann Fitz-Gerald, Director of the Balsillie School of International Affairs and an East Africa security analyst. This common ground allows it to build on its reputation as a long-term NATO member and trusted economic partner.

In Djibouti, the Abdulhamid Han II Mosque, with a capacity of 6,000, is the largest in the country. The project came about during a 2015 visit by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to Djibouti, where President Ismail Omar Gulleh told him that he wanted to see an Ottoman mosque in his capital. 

Turkey’s parliamentary speaker Mustafa Sentop attended its inaugural Friday prayer in 2019 when it opened to the public. In December 2017, Gulleh returned the favour, his third visit to Turkey, at which point relations between the countries had already been gaining momentum.

Turkey is interested in cultivating relations with East African countries and ensuring its visibility in a region where Ankara has considerably increased its profile in the last decade

Turkish Airlines has direct flights between the countries, while TIKA, Turkey’s aid agency, has established offices and projects across Djibouti. By 2018, Turkey agreed to finance and construct the Ambouli Friendship Dam. 

Turkey’s ambassador to Djibouti said that whilst the mosque project was “socially and architecturally important”, the dam would have a tangible impact in water management in a flood prone part of the country. 

Djibouti’s ambassador to Turkey told Daily Sabah that his country wants to provide room for Turkey in the region because it views Turkey as a “strategic partner”.

In Somalia, the presence of the Turkish state has also been much more visible following a high profile visit by president Erdogan to Mogadishu in 2011, making him the first non-African leader to visit the country in twenty years.

Five years later, Turkey opened its largest overseas embassy in Mogadishu and began cooperating with Somali authorities in a variety of fields, from health and infrastructure to education and security.

Relations between the countries initially focussed on humanitarian challenges, says Abdinor Dahir, a researcher at TRT World Research Centre, but Turkey noticed early on how much potential there was in Somalia.

“Between 2011 and 2013, Somalia was struggling with famine and the relationship focussed on humanitarian issues,” Dahir told The New Arab. “After that the relationship became more comprehensive and expanded into development assistance and state-building.”

This assistance involves everything from the mundane equipping of government ministries, to more complex challenges such as training cadets at Camp TURKSOM for the Somali National Army, Dahir said, and differentiates Turkey from other MENA powers in that it has the capacity to deliver high level development assistance. 

Additional Somali troops have also enrolled in commando training programs in the southwestern Turkish province of Isparta, with a batch of elite units returning in early March.

Whilst security cooperation has played an important role in bilateral relations, Turkish construction firms have completed critical projects in the country, including building Somalia’s new parliament.

Turkey distinguishes itself from Africa’s European, Chinese and American partners through its shared religious identity with the region

“Ten years of trust-based relationship building with Somalia has enabled infrastructural and business investments that added a tangible element to its soft power diplomacy,” Fitz-Gerald told The New Arab.

In a widely publicised official visit to Ankara, Somalia’s Turkish-educated justice minister joked that “it wouldn’t be a lie to say that Turkish has become the second language of Somalia.” Turkey’s efforts have borne fruit with Somali officials. 

In February, Middle East Eye reported that Turkey intended to launch its mission to the moon from Somalia. Local media also reported in early 2020 that Turkey was invited by Somalia to explore its seas for oil.

Turkey’s support for Somalia’s fledging central government, however, hasn’t come without a cost. Earlier this year two Turkish nationals working on a road between Mogadishu and Afgoye were killed in an attack by Al-Shabab. 

A similar attack targeting the Turkish project killed 79 Somali nationals and wounded Turkish engineers in late 2019. In the summer of 2020, Al-Shabab conducted an attack on the Turkish base in Mogadishu. 

Somalia is now also locked in a political crisis which has threatened to embroil Somalia’s Turkish trained Gorgor and Haramad elite units. Opposition politicians alleged that Turkish and American trained forces were used against them to suppress protests, urging those commanders to be dismissed and for the military to remain out of politics. 

Turkey recently offered its support in resolving Somalia’s electoral crisis, with reports indicating a possible visit by foreign minister Mevlut Cavusoglu to Mogadishu soon.

Turkey’s security footprint has also grown beyond Somalia and has attracted the attention of East Africa’s two hegemon’s, Kenya and Ethiopia, whose interests have a nexus point in Somalia where both are important players in the country’s security matrix. 

Kenyan and Ethiopian peacekeepers have supported the Somali government’s fight against Al-Shabab as part of AMISOM, an African Union mission to help stabilise the country. Troops from both countries are also deployed bilaterally in various parts of southern Somalia. 

“Both Ethiopia and Kenya have long-invested in the fight against Al-Shabaab,” Fitz-Gerald says, “and will wish to see Turkey continue its military cooperation in Somalia by propping up the capacity of the Somali National Army to defend against this ongoing terrorist threat.” 

The Turkish approach in East Africa differs from West Africa, says Abdinoor Dahir, in that Turkey “has ended up on a collision course with France which is a major power in West Africa. In the Horn, Turkey didn’t challenge traditional regional powers or their interests but looked to build ties based on trust and common interests.”

Earlier this year, Kenya’s military ordered 118 Hizir four-wheel drive personnel carriers from Turkish manufacturer Katmerciler. The purchase, intended to help in Kenya’s fight with Somali militant group Al-Shabab, introduced Turkish armoured vehicles to the African market.

Turkey has carved out a niche role through its projection of soft power, economic development and security engagement in the Horn of Africa

A month after the order was placed, reports began to emerge about a role for Turkey in an ongoing maritime dispute between Somalia and Kenya over an energy rich triangle which juts out from their shared border.

“Turkey is one of the most influential countries in the Horn of Africa,” says Peter Kagwanja of the Nairobi based Africa Policy Institute. “To construct new engagements, we need to craft wide frameworks, project regional power and anchor it in sustainable partnerships with Turkey.” 

Ethiopia, one of Africa’s largest markets and fastest growing economies, has also been an important target of Turkish diplomacy and investment. In early February, Ethiopian FM Demeke Mekonnen visited Ankara to inaugurate the Ethiopian embassy’s new building in Ankara where the Turkish FM Cavusoglu was also present. 

Speaking at the ceremony, Cavusoglu recounted the historical ties between the countries dating back to 1896, but the focus of the event was very much on the present and future of bilateral ties.

Turkey today is the second largest foreign investor in Ethiopia after China, according to the Ethiopian Investment Commission, and has close to 200 companies employing 20,000 people. 

Whilst Turkish businesses have faced some challenges in Ethiopia’s difficult business climate, in the fields of clothes and textiles Turkish products have made gains in Addis Ababa’s makeshift markets and stores in recent months, with shop owners preferring to import their goods from Turkey rather than Dubai. 

“We lacked a good sense of judgement to navigate and forecast the changes, but we know now, and we’re sticking with Turkey,” one shop owner told Addis Fortune.

Ankara’s outreach even led Ethiopia to signal its openness to Turkish mediation in its border conflict with Sudan during FM Demeke Mekonnen’s visit to Turkey. 

Positive developments in relations between Turkey and Egypt also led Turkey to offer its mediation between Cairo and Addis Ababa on the Nile dam dispute.

Turkey has carved out a “niche role” says Anne Fitz-Gerald through its projection of soft power, economic development and security engagement in the Horn of Africa. Abdinoor agrees, and adds that Turkey’s diplomacy and investment have turned it from an actor with little presence, to a country that all in the region are interested in upgrading ties with.

Scramble for Horn of Africa by Gulf, Orient, Western and African interests

Sunday, July 14, 2019

THE EASTAFRICAN

The self-declared republic of Somaliland is the latest diplomatic and economic battleground in the Horn of Africa.

It pits interests from the Gulf, the West, the Mediterranean and Africa, from Kenya and Ethiopia to Guinea.

What started as a tweet by Kenya’s Foreign Affairs Principal Secretary Macharia Kamau on May 27 has brought to the surface a covert competition for political and economic influence in the Horn.

Mr Kamau’s tweet that he had met Somaliland Foreign Minister Yasin Hagi Mohamed and discussed issues of mutual interest and ways of strengthening co-operation between the two countries infuriated Mogadishu, which has refused to recognise Somaliland’s secession since 1991.

Mogadishu responded by issuing a protest letter to Nairobi for hosting officials of the breakaway Somaliland, and summoned Kenya’s ambassador to Somalia Lucas Tumbo.

“We consider this tweet an affront to Somali sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity, as well as harmful to the relationship between Somalia and Kenya,” said the protest letter, which was based on the “One-Somalia” policy.

A week later, Somalia broke diplomatic ties with Guinea for affording the protocol of a head of state to Somaliland president Musa Bihi during his one week visit to Conakry.

INTERESTS

After Somalia severed diplomatic relations with Guinea, President Bihi accused Mogadishu of working with Western countries, especially Italy.

“We are now seeing Somalia working with some countries in the West to frustrate our quest for recognition and at the same time bully our international friends who are sympathetic to our cause,” said President Bihi.

Somaliland declared its separation from Somalia in 1991, but it is yet to be recognised by the international community despite maintaining trade relations and political contacts with a number of countries including Kenya, UK, Belgium, Turkey, Djibouti, Ethiopia and the United Arab Emirates.

Rashid Abdi, an analyst on the Horn and the Gulf, believes Somalia and Somaliland should break the three decades of stalemate to enhance their international standing.

“Somaliland cannot win recognition without Somalia’s consent and Somalia cannot impose a solution on Somaliland,” Mr Abdi said in a tweet on the dispute.

There are concerns in Mogadishu that Kenya is trying to forge closer ties with Somaliland as a leverage over the maritime dispute with Nairobi that comes up for hearing at the International Court of Justice on September 9.

The Kenya-Somalia maritime dispute has brought in external players from the West with interests in oil, gas, fishing, regional security and internal Somali politics, and is now sucking in Somaliland.

Yusuf Gabobe, a veteran Somaliland journalist, told The EastAfrican that the Farmaajo administration has been particularly sensitive to any country maintaining relations with Somaliland.

“Previous governments in Mogadishu and the majority of Somali people have no issues with Somaliland being recognised, but some elements in the current government have been keen to block any outside dealings with Somaliland because of some historical grudges,” said Mr Gabobe.

INVESTMENTS

Now, the United Arab Emirates — an ally of Saudi Arabia in their competition with the Qatar/Turkey axis for political and economic influence in the Horn — is emerging as a critical player.

The UAE has been a major player behind the scenes in the newly found Cushitic Alliance between Somalia, Ethiopia and Eritrea.

In the past year, the UAE has been on the wrong side of Mogadishu by maintaining bilateral relations with Puntland state, where it is training and funding security forces.

In October 2018, Somalia also protested a deal between Somaliland and UAE company DP World for the $442 million expansion of the Berbera port without consulting Mogadishu.

Somaliland hopes the port’s expansion will boost its economy by attracting other international investors, reduce unemployment and set it on the road to independence from Somalia. Ethiopia has also bought shares in the port.

Somaliland head of liaison office in Kenya Bashe Omar told The EastAfrican that Somaliland is strategically located for trade with the international community.

“We have a long and safe coastline and we are developing the port and fishing infrastructure to attract investors. Most investors are looking at security along our coastline and even when piracy was at its peak, our coastline was quiet,” said Mr Omar.

CRITICAL PLAYERS

The UAE has in recent years sought closer ties with countries in the Horn of Africa. The UAE, along with Saudi Arabia, helped mediate the peace accord between former enemies Ethiopia and Eritrea last year.

It is part of a larger plan to broker peace in the region as the alliance battles Houthi rebels in Yemen. Sudan, which is now in transition after the ouster of former leader Omar al-Bashir in April, is a key contributor of troops to the Alliance in Yemen.

In return UAE, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, with tacit approval of the United States, have committed $3 billion to cushion Khartoum from any difficulties during the upheavals.

To deepen its influence in the Horn, the UAE last week struck a deal with the Ethiopian government to take in 50,000 workers in the 2019/2020 financial year, who will receive training in various sectors.

The number could rise to 200,000 people in 2022 as Ethiopia pursues similar deals with Japan and some European countries.

According to Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, these are short-term measures to reduce unemployment by sending skilled labour to foreign countries. Last year, the UAE pledged to invest $3 billion in aid and investment in Ethiopia.

In the proxy war, the United States and China are not far behind. Both have naval bases in Djibouti, but the US presence appears to be waning as China’s is rising. Through China Merchant Port Holdings, the country controls the Doraleh container terminal whose expansion into a free trade zone will rival Dubai.

Djibouti’s location along sea lanes between Asia, Europe, the Middle East and Africa is critical to the sustainability of the China Road and Bridge (Silk Road) projects that envisages control of logistics infrastructure across the world.

Djibouti, Somaliland and Eritrea are important to global superpowers for acting as a sieve for migrants heading to Europe through the Mediterranean, and curbing the spread of extremism that has entrenched itself in Somalia.

UK, Russia and UAE scramble to set up military bases in Somaliland

January 08, 2019

Daily Nation

The United Kingdom has joined Russia and the United Arab Emirates in the scramble to set up military bases in Somaliland.

UK Defence Secretary Gavin Williamson at the weekend met President Mouse Bihi in Hargeysa, and discussed ways on strengthening the relationship between the two countries.

Somaliland, a former British colony, is yet to be recognised internationally.

The Somaliland embassy in Nairobi, neither denied not confirmed reports that Britain was seeking to set up a military base in the horn of Africa country. Somaliland Ambassador to Kenya Omar Bashe said his country was excited over Mr Williamson’s visit which, he said, would help the country’s push for international recognition after breaking away from Somalia.

Mr Bashe said Mr Williamson’s visit was a clear indicator that the international community recognises the importance of Somaliland.

The visit comes barely a week after Mr Williamson said the UK was keen on building new military bases around the world after Brexit. It is believed his visit to Somaliland sought to discuss the possibilities of setting up a base in the country. 

“For so long – literally for decades – so much of our national view point has been dominated by the discussion about the European Union. This is our moment to be that true global player once more – and I think the armed forces play a really important role,” said Mr Williamson.

Mr Williamson, who last week visited the British army in Kenya, said that Brexit would allow the UK to change the 1960s policy of withdrawal from regions ‘east of Suez.’

Britain joins Russia which last April announced its intention to set up a naval base in Saylac, Somaliland.

A Russian delegation held talks with Somaliland government for a 1,500 man base to support its warships and hunter-killer submarines to operate in the volatile region and busy shipping lanes that carry most of Europe’s goods.

The United Arab Emirates is also building a military base in Berbera. The UAE base, which will begin operating by June, includes a coastal-surveillance system.

The UAE is growing its military presence in the Horn of Africa to protect trade flows through the Bab el-Mandeb, a key shipping lane used by oil tankers and other cargo vessels en route to the Suez Canal. Emirati footholds in Somaliland and Eritrea provide strategic locations as the UAE supports the Saudi Arabia-led war against Houthi rebels in Yemen.

Kenya, Somaliland agree on direct KQ flights, consulate as ties deepen

December 15, 2020

Nation Media Group

Kenya on Tuesday reached a deal for direct Kenya Airways flights to Hargeisa in Somaliland, in what could be the first destination for the national carrier into a Somali region, following years of trying.

While making an “unwavering commitment” to deepen their ties, Presidents Uhuru Kenyatta and visiting Muse Bihi of Somaliland on Tuesday agreed agreed that the flights will begin by March 2021.

Nairobi also agreed to set up a consulate in Hargeisa by the first quarter of 2021, joining Ethiopia and Djibouti, which have diplomatic outposts in the Somaliland capital.

The move came hours after Somalia, which sees Somaliland as its territory, severed ties with Kenya in protest against what it called constant interference with its internal affairs.

“The two leaders agreed to timelines for implementation of a number of activities,” said a statement from the Foreign Affairs ministry in Kenya. “Kenya [agreed] to open its consulate in Hargeisa by end of March 2021. Somaliland [will] also upgrade its liaison office in Nairobi within the same timeframe.”

Somaliland declared independence from Somalia in 1991 and is routinely treated as separate from that country but Somalia has never recognised it.

Across the world, only Taiwan, which is also seen by China as its territory, has recognised Somaliland.

A dispatch from Nairobi said the leaders “acknowledged” Somaliland’s longstanding stability and pledged to continue to “work together to promote peace and stability, in pursuit of shared prosperity”.

Travel papers

Besides the direct flights, Kenya offered to recognise Somaliland’s travel papers, which by March 2021 should enable acquisition of visas on arrival especially for senior government officials.

That offer and others on opening trading channels for agricultural and livestock products looked like a stick to Somalia. Somalis don’t get visas on arrival in Kenya. They have to apply for them days before travel.

Somalilanders, using their travel papers, will be eligible for e-visas as well. Because their papers have limited recognition across the world, most senior government officials of Somaliland routinely apply for diplomatic passports in Mogadishu, which they use to travel around the world.

With direct flights to Hargeisa, Kenya may have attained a target it failed to in Mogadishu.

Jambojet, the low-cost affiliate of Kenya Airways, was forced to delay operations in June after Mogadishu reportedly increased insurance charges on air tickets and landing rights, seen as a non-tariff barrier by officials in Nairobi.

Complex relationship

The relationship between Somaliland and Somalia has been troubled since the 1960s.

At 1am Tuesday, Somalia announced it was cutting ties with Kenya after it hosted Mr Bihi, which it saw as a spite on its sovereignty.

The move signaled President Mohamed Farmaajo’s had discarded the diplomatic rulebook of engagement with Kenya, as Information Minister Osman Dubbe made the announcement while Nairobi was asleep.

By morning, Kenyan officials said they had received no formal communication of the severance, but admitted they were waking up to a new way of relating with Somalia, away from the usual diplomatic channels.

“We will ignore [this]. It is a game he is trying to have us play but we won’t,” said an official speaking on the background of the developments, to avoid commenting ahead of the official response.

Later, Kenya’s Government Spokesman Cyrus Oguna told journalists that the country will seek to restore diplomatic ties rather than pursue revenge.

The feeling in Nairobi is that President Farmaajo was trying to cultivate a nationalistic support for his re-election campaign, especially since some of the issues raised could be discussed at diplomatic level.

However, Kenya’s timing of hosting President Bihi in Nairobi was seen in Somalia as another slap in the face.

Diplomats to leave

Mr Dubbe said on national TV that Kenya has “constantly interfered” with Somalia’s internal affairs and that Nairobi was violating Somalia’s sovereignty.

“This decision was taken in response to the political abuse and deliberate interference of Kenya on the independence of Somalia,” said Dubbe.

The Somali minister further said Kenyan diplomats in Mogadishu will have seven days to leave the country.

A week ago, Mogadishu expelled Kenyan ambassador to Somalia, Lucas Tumbo, and recalled its envoy to Nairobi, Mohamud Ahmed Tarzan, following a similar complaint of interference.

In addition, Somalia has submitted a complaint to the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (Igad) for inclusion of the spat with Kenya in the December 20 virtual summit on Tigray.

Legal bindings

Kenya became the second country in a year after Guinea, with which Somalia has cut ties over the Somaliland issue.

But as Mogadishu moved in the night, Nairobi hosted Bihi for bilateral talks with President Kenyatta.

Both sides on Monday said they had agreed on a number of issues and would continue discussions on Tuesday on business and security cooperation.

The cutting of diplomatic ties means the Kenyan embassy in Mogadishu and Somalia’s mission in Nairobi will be shut and officials sent back home.

But both countries, based on the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, will remain obligated to offer visa and other travel and immigration services to their nationals.

In fact, the countries will remain obligated to protect the premises they host.

They have a legal obligation to protect their citizens but this role may be granted to a third acceptable State.

Military cooperation

It was unclear by Tuesday morning what will happen to military cooperation between Somalia and Kenya, which has sent troops to Somalia under the African Union Mission in Somalia (Amisom).

Legally, it is Amisom to make a decision about troop movements, but in consultation with the UN and troop contributing countries.

Meanwhile, residents of Kenya’s Mandera County on Tuesday reported an escalated deployment of Somali National Army troops at the border point even as opposition supporters in Mogadishu protested President Farmaajo’s refusal to hold dialogue on controversial electoral teams.

There is also the matter of refugees as about 350,000 Somali refugees live in Kenya, most of them in camps in Dadaab and Kakuma.

Kenya will have to continue protecting them, under the international humanitarian law.

What may be exposed, however, are the properties owned by Somalia businesses and politicians in Nairobi.

Officials in the Kenyan capital said on Tuesday morning that they had not yet received any formal communication from Mogadishu on severing ties.

Somalia cuts diplomatic ties with Kenya over Somaliland

Tuesday, December 15, 2020

Nation Media Group

Somalia on Tuesday morning announced it is cutting diplomatic ties with Kenya, in the latest escalation of a spat between the two, and following the invitation of Somaliland leader Muse Bihi to Nairobi.

Osman Dubbe, the Somali Minister for Information declared the news on national TV a few minutes to 2am in the morning, breaking tradition of countries making such pronouncements during the day.

Dubbe said Kenya had “constantly interfered” with Somalia’s internal affairs and that Nairobi was violating Somalia’s sovereignty.

He said Kenyan diplomats in Mogadishu will have seven days to leave the country. But this came just a week after Mogadishu actually expelled the Kenyan ambassador to Somalia, Lucas Tumbo, and recalled theirs to Nairobi, Mohamud Ahmed Tarzan, following a similar complaint of interference.

Somalia had also submitted a complaint to regional bloc, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), to include the spat with Kenya during the upcoming virtual summit on Dec 20 on Tigray.

Kenya though, became the second country in a year after Guinea, with which Somalia has cut ties over the Somaliland issue.

Kenya hosts Bihi

But as Mogadishu moved in the night, Nairobi was hosting Bihi for bilateral talks with President Uhuru Kenyatta. Both sides on Monday said they had agreed on a number of issues and would continue discussions on Tuesday on business and security cooperation.

With the cutting of diplomatic ties, it means the Kenyan embassy in Mogadishu and Somalia’s mission in Nairobi will be shut and their officials sent back home. But both countries, based on Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, will remain obligated to offer visa and other travel and immigration services to nationals of each other.

In fact, each country will remain obligated to protect premises owned by either side on their host territories.

However, despite having legal obligations to protect citizens of each other, the actual protection of each other’s nationals may be granted to a third acceptable state.

It was unclear by Tuesday morning what will happen to military cooperation between Somalia and Kenya which has sent troops to the country under the African Union Mission in Somalia (Amisom). Legally, it is Amisom to make a decision about troop movements, but in consultation with the UN and troop contributing countries.

About 350,000 Somali refugees also live in Kenya, most of them in camps in Dadaab and Kakuma. Kenya will have to continue protecting them, under the international humanitarian law.

What may be exposed, however, are the properties owned by Somalia businesses and politicians in Nairobi.

Officials in the Kenyan capital said on Tuesday morning they had not yet received any formal communication from Mogadishu on the severing of ties.

Kenya caught up in middle of Somalia’s deadly ‘game of thrones’

Saturday, June 01, 2019

Daily Nation

Diplomatic shifts and new alliances in the Horn of Africa call to mind William Shakespeare’s play Julius Caesar, where a soothsayer warns Caesar: “Beware the ides of March” (or 15 March) — which ancient Romans considered as a deadline for settling debts.

The famous Roman military general and politician never headed the warning, running into his enemies who assassinated him and settled their political debt, leading to the demise of democratic Roman Republic and the rise of the totalitarian Roman Empire.

The Kenya-Somalia diplomatic meltdown over a disputed maritime border in the Indian Ocean and unfolding geopolitical alignments ahead of the coming state presidential election in Jubaland in Southern Somalia in August 2019 are unveiling the ugly contours of a new policy of containment of Kenya’s power and influence by an emerging regional alliance in the Horn of Africa.

The new policy of containment targeting Kenya as a pivotal regional state replaces the old containment in the 1960s and 1970s that sought to check Somalia’s militarism behind the 1963-67 Shifta War with Kenya and the 1978 Ogaden War with Ethiopia.

Unlike the larger world which enjoyed a quarter century of peace after the Cold War, the Horn of Africa emerged as a theatre of civil wars, insurgencies, and terrorism.

ELECTIONS

After the Eritrean-Ethiopian War (1998-2000), containment in the Horn of Africa focused on Eritrea whose isolation also led to proxy wars.

But the region also developed a new security arrangement weaved around the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (Igad).

However, realignments around the coming Jubaland elections herald the waning of the ideological consensus that under-girdled regional security.

Instead, a searing sibling power rivalry is propelling new bouts of proxy wars and the rise of a new policy of containment against Kenya and its allies.

Kenya and its rivals will meet their Waterloo in the Jubaland election in August.

Leading one side in the fierce battle for the soul of Jubaland is the incumbent state president, Sheikh Ahmed Mohamed Islam, aka Madoobe or Blackie.

Elected first in May 2013, and largely confident of retaining his seat in 2019, Madobe represents the old regional consensus that still view Kenya as the region’s ‘shining city upon the hill’.

TERRORISM

With the help of Kenya, Madobe led the Somali forces to recapture Kismayo from Al-Shabaab, emerging as a bulwark against terrorism.

The August election will test to the limit KDF and the African Forces in Somalia (Amisom) in restoring normalcy and democracy in war-ravaged Somalia.

On the other extreme in the battle for Jubaland is the incumbent, President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed, alias Farmaajo, determined to win the coming Presidential elections in Mogadishu in 2020 and break the jinx where no past president has been re-elected since 1991.

But Farmaajo’s Jubaland re-election strategy casts a dark shadow over the future stability of the Somali nation.

It has all the trappings of the “tail-wagging-the-dog” strategy where politicians ignite diplomatic conflict to divert the public from internal challenges while whipping and riding on the wave of nationalism to win hotly contested elections.

Jubaland and the Kenya-Somali maritime dispute comes as a windfall in Farmaajo’s re-election strategy.

ETHNOCRACY

Second, Farmaajo has supported members of his “Nabad iyo Nolol” or “Peace and Prosperity Party” to win state presidential elections and take over the mantle in the federal states.

The installation of Abdiaziz Laftagareen in South West State of Somalia is so far the greatest success for the “Nabad iyo Nolol” strategy.

Third, the lynch pin of this re-election strategy is the revival of Somalia’s old ‘ethnocracy’ around the Marehan Clan.

Most of Somalia’s pivotal leaders are from Farmaajo’s Marehan clan, including top officials of the National Intelligence and Security Agency and, tellingly, Al-Shabaab’s current leader (Ahmad Umar) and commanders of its powerful Intelligence Unit (Amniyat).

This re-election strategy heralds the return of clan supremacist politics that pushed the regime of Siad Barre (also Marehan) to the brink and the Somali nation to civil war.

As the majority in Jubaland, the Marehan are being actively mobilised along clan lines to defeat Madobe, a scion of the Ogaden sub-clan.

On their part, Ogaden communities living in Garissa — the Awilyahan, Abduwak and Abdalla — have raised the stakes, endorsing Madobe.

JUBALAND

As Somalia’s richest federal state endowed with fertile farmlands, rich grazing fields, a long and beautiful coastline rich with marine resources and pristine white sandy beaches for tourists, the battle for Jubaland carries eerie echoes of the “new scramble” for Africa”.

Jubaland is at the heart of the maritime dispute between Kenya and Somalia.

In a sense, the battle for Jubaland reveals the democratic rollback and the growing populism and totalitarianism across the Horn.

Jubaland also reflects the waning fortunes of Pan-Africanism in the face of a surging Cushitic consciousness now coalescing around the idea of the New Horn of Africa as a counter to Igad.

Ahead of the Jubaland election, Mogadishu’s supremacists are reportedly negotiating with partners in the ‘New Horn’ Axis and the geopolitical faction in the Gulf allied to Turkey and Qatar to support their takeover of Jubaland from Amisom and the Kenyan troops.

KISMAYO PORT

They plan to forge bilateral military arrangements with Ethiopia and Eritrean outside the Amisom mandate to influence the outcomes of the Jubaland polls.

On its part, landlocked Ethiopia is aggressively seeking access to Somali ports, including the KDF-ran Kismayo port.

It has developed a navy force to ply and guard its interests in the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean.

While the new containment strategy is radicalising Kenya’s regional diplomacy, the country will require ingenuity and flexibility to survive the new diplomatic onslaught

Tension rises as Farmaajo threatens to kick out KDF troops under Amisom

December 20, 2020

Nation Media Group

The relationship between Kenya and Somalia continues to deteriorate, with President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo threatening to expel Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) troops who are part of the African Union Mission in Somalia (Amisom).

Regional leaders held a meeting in Djibouti on Sunday that included Farmaajo and his Kenyan counterpart Uhuru Kenyatta.

Others present were Sudanese PM Abdalla Hamdok, Ethiopian PM Abiy Ahmed, Djibouti leader Ismael Guelleh, and South Sudan VP and Defence Minister Rebecca Nyandeng

Farmaajo’s threat comes days after Somalia expelled Kenyan diplomats in a memo sent to Nairobi at1am. On Friday, Defence CS Monica Juma cancelled a press conference at Kenya Army Headquarters at the eleventh hour.

“Everything was set but she did not turn up,” a senior military official told the Nation.

Farmaajo wants Eritrean soldiers to replace KDF in the African Union Mission to Somalia (Amisom).

Under the agreement that governs Amisom’s Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs), the host government cannot withdraw consent from such a country.

Anti-Kenya campaign

Somalia has dispatched officials to Amisom TTCs and other influential states in an anti-Kenya campaign.

The 38th Extraordinary Summit of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (Igad) has been preceded with a dispute over agenda.

Initially called by chairman and Sudanese PM Abdalla Hamdok to discuss the humanitarian crisis in Tigray, the agenda had by Friday been altered to Covid-19 response.

Ethiopia fought discussing Tigray at Igad level, insisting it is an internal matter.

Somalia accused Kenya of interfering in its affairs and forced Kenyan ambassador Lucas Tumbo to leave. It recalled its envoy in Nairobi, Mahmud Ahmed Nur Tarzan.

Later, Mogadishu wrote to Igad seeking to have the issue discussed at the summit. That was before Somalia officially cut diplomatic ties with Nairobi.

The question is if Igad will resolve the matter, given that most of its members have interests in Somalia. Eritrean leader Isaias Afwerki may not even be at the summit.

Afwerki has been helping train Somalia troops. Eritrea is involved in a border dispute with Djibouti.

Until recently, Qatari troops were stationed at the disputed border but were withdrawn when Djibouti sided with Saudi Arabia as Gulf nations imposed a blockade on Doha. Eritrea also backed Riyadh.

Mended fences

Asmara suspended itself from Igad in 2006, protesting the dominance of Ethiopia’s TPLF regime. Eritrea has since mended fences with Addis Ababa.

Horn of Africa analyst and director of Southlink Consultants Abdiwahab Sheikh Abdisamad said Igad members have divergent policies on Somalia.

“Ethiopia and Kenya are not reading from the same script. It will be important if they harmonise their views. This is no time for proxies,” he said.

“Kenya should lie low until after the (Somalia) elections. Whoever wins may be willing to talk.”

During a forum on Kenya-Somalia relations on Thursday, Mr Ahmed Mohamed, senior adviser at the Horn Institute, told the audience that every Igad member has problems affecting other countries.

“There are competing influences of Mogadishu’s neighbours and a desire to have an ally in Villa Somalia. Farmaajo is attempting to control the impact of regional influences,” he said.

“Foreign interference has taken a toll on Somalia. Somalia is at war with herself and neighbours.”

‘Political abuse’

Information minister Osman Dubbe said in severing ties, Somalia was responding to “the political abuse and interference by Kenya on our independence”.

The move came as Nairobi hosted Somaliland President Muse Bihi, with whom Kenya agreed to start direct flights and set up a consulate in Hargeisa by March.

Farmaajo’s reaction baffled many since his administration had endorsed Kenya’s application to set up a diplomatic outpost in Hargeisa.

Shadrack Kuyo, a senior adviser at the Horn Centre, said the Somali President is escalating tensions to win another term.

“He rode to power in 2017 on the back of anti-Ethiopian sentiments,” Kuyo said.

Somalia is unhappy that Jubbaland President Ahmed Madobe has threatened to stop elections in his state unless the national army pulls out of Gedo.

Last week, Mogadishu witnessed protests against the teams set up to officiate elections, with opposition candidates demanding their disbandment.

Amid the chaos, officials in Nairobi worry al-Shabaab could thrive.

New warning

Mr Zadock Syong’oh, a former assistant minister, argued that Somalia’s situation makes it hard to relate with the centre alone.

Abdiwahab said the role of Gulf countries like Qatar has become too crucial to ignore, especially as they fund the government and some candidates.

Western countries like the US and the United Kingdom as well as Turkey, which is the biggest humanitarian aid provider to Somalia, have had influence on the country.

The federal government of Somalia Saturday intensified its diplomatic assault in a statement warning Kenya against supporting a “rebel group” based in Mandera to attack Somali forces based in Beled Hawa.

The statement was referring to Jubbaland forces based on the Kenyan side of the border.

Alarm as Somalia deploys soldiers to Mandera border

December 15, 2020

Nation Media Group

A few hours after Somalia announced it was cutting diplomatic ties with Kenya, the Somalia National Army (SNA) was deployed to the common border.

In Mandera County, residents reported seeing SNA troops taking strategic positions along the border.

“We have woken up to the sight of military officers along the border. This is very worrying,” said resident Ali Abdille.

SNA’s move, including placing technical vehicles at Border Point Three, forced locals to start leaving their homes in case of danger.

A senior security officer in Mandera, who sought anonymity, confirmed the arrival of the Somali military officers.

“We have information about what is happening along the border but that is an issue that will be decided by higher offices in Nairobi,” the source said.

Strained relations

Somali Minister for Information Osman Dubbe announced on national TV early Tuesday that his country was cutting diplomatic ties with Kenya.

Dubbe said Kenya had “constantly interfered” with Somalia’s internal affairs and that Nairobi was violating Somalia’s sovereignty.

The announcement came as President Uhuru Kenyatta hosted Somaliland President Muse Bihi in Nairobi.

Mandera businessman Issack Adan said: “We are asking Nairobi to ensure any issue between the two countries is resolved for peace to prevail.”

“This situation is going to affect business interactions between Mandera and Somalia since we get most of our goods from there,” he added.

Mandera relies heavily on Mogadishu for business supplies considering the long distance to Nairobi.

Tigray crisis: How Abiy’s reform strategy plunged Ethiopia into conflict

Monday, January 04, 2021

Nation Media Group

Tigray,

When Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed came to power in 2018, he largely ushered a wave of political reforms.

His first few months in office were characterised by the introduction of a series of political reforms which made him be referred to by many as a “reform champion”.

Among his swift reform moves included the release of thousands of political prisoners, relaxing media control and liberalisation.

But a major turn in events came in June 2018 when Abiy announced his country will “fully accept and implement” a 2000 peace pact which Addis Ababa refused to immediately honour under the former EPRDF regime.

Peace deal

A few weeks later, a peace deal was signed between Abiy and Eritrean President Isaias Afeworki, ending two-decade-long hostilities.

The peace deal led Abiy to win the Nobel Peace prize award in 2019.

After the rapprochement, the former rival neighbours resumed diplomatic ties, reopened border crossings allowing separated families to reunite, further enabling people on both sides to resume trade.

However, these windows of hope didn’t last long as border crossings on both sides were shut down a few weeks later for unclear reasons.

Mr Abiy’s popular reform ideas, however, started to increasingly attract serious criticism from political groups, including from Tigray elites whose people were the ones who most sacrificed during the 1998-2000 border war with Eritrea, which claimed the lives of at least 70,000 people.

Two-man agreement

The Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) said the peace deal was a two-man agreement and it doesn’t represent a peace agreement between two countries, hence it was not institutionalised.

Ever since Abiy Ahmed came to power, the Tigray regional government has been at odds with the central government.

Tigray leaders have been defying almost all decisions made by the federal government.

The major driving factors of the conflict in Ethiopia’s Tigray region are generally over differences in the system of governance, electoral disputes and power struggles between TPLF leaders and Prime Minister Abiy.

The war on Tigray has two major elements, ideological and historical, says Abera Negash, a political researcher.

“The ideological side of the war is the contention between those who advocate the federalist state arrangement which embraces regional self-determination and self-administration as its cardinal principle [like TPLF] and those who want a unilateralist and centralised state structure with a strong central government [Abiy’s party, PP]”

Tigray leaders see Abiy’s reforms as an attempt to centralise power and attempt to demolish the long-standing federal system which TPLF had embraced since it assumed power in 1991 after toppling the former Marxist Derg regime.

The TPLF, which represents an ethnic Tigrayan minority, dominated the country’s national politics and power for 27 years until Abiy came to power in 2018.

The tension between TPLF and Abiy started when the prime minister announced he would dissolve the former TPLF dominated EPRDF ruling party and merge it with his new Prosperity Party (PP), a move TPLF strongly protested against and refused to join the new alliance.

However, “there is an extraordinary background to the war that started immediately after Abiy assumed power,” says a Tigray opposition official who sought anonymity.

“In this respect, the federal government has been taking several measures purposely aimed at sidelining the Tigray region, its leadership and people from the rest of the country”.

“The Abiy government had been selectively prosecuting ethnic Tigray officials over different accusations, including corruption, and further removed them from top government positions. Tigrayan military officials were also fired.”

The opposition official said “the targeted prosecution measures created grievances among the Tigray people and their leaders which escalated into a full-fledged war sooner than later”.

Feud escalated

The feud with the federal government further escalated in September, when the Tigray region held its own elections, defying the central government’s decision to postpone the national polls due to the Covid-19 pandemic. The election was initially scheduled to be held in August 2020.

The region then argued that conducting the election was its constitutional right but its defiance, in effect, undermined the legitimacy of Abiy’s federal government.

Addis Ababa immediately ruled that the election was illegitimate and void. In return, Tigray said it will no longer recognise Abiy’s administration, arguing that Abiy’s constitutional mandate in office had expired.

Tigray leaders accused the Nobel Laureate of deliberately postponing the election to retain his grip on power.

After the regional elections, the federal government reacted by slashing budgets, funds and subsidies to Tigray.

Abiy further ordered all federal institutions to immediately cut ties and communication with the regional government.

Tigray leaders saw the punitive measures as a “declaration of war” against Tigray and its people who make up six per cent of the country’s estimated 110 million population.

However, the tension between Tigray and the central government boiled early in November when Prime Minister Abiy accused TPLF forces of attacking a federal army based in the region.

‘Red line’

In a televised address, Abiy said Tigray had crossed the “red line” and he officially declared a military offensive against the region on November 4.

He sent ground and air forces in a bid to dislodge the TPLF-led regional force, raising fears of a protracted conflict in Africa’s second-most populous country.

Amare Seyoum, a former army member and resident of Mekelle, explains why TPLF had attacked the North Command Army.

“The federal government wants to restructure the military structure by increasing regional military commands from five to six as an effort to wage war against Tigray from all directions by sandwiching it,” he told the Nation.

Amare said the federal government has also mobilised the military as part of the preparation to wage war against Tigray.

“This has also been a warning sign for TPLF. Cognisant of this move, TPLF has taken pre-emptive measures against the North Command Army and controlled their base and seized all their heavy weapons. They took hostage its leaders as a self-defence mechanism.”

“The attack served as an immediate cause for the federal government to trigger war on Tigray,” he added.

Since early November, the Tigray region remained a battleground.

After the capture of the regional capital Mekelle on November 30, PM Abiy announced that the law enforcement operation against the region was over and what remained is a hunt to arrest TPLF leaders.

However, several sources from the region have confirmed to the Nation that fighting is going on between the Tigray defence forces and the allied forces of ENDF, Eritrean forces, and the Amhara militia in many rural parts of the region.

The war may be arguably over, but there will be sporadic battles.

Sources said TPLF is fighting against joint Federal forces, Amhara regional forces and militias as well as Eritrean soldiers.

“The war may be arguably over, but there will be sporadic battles so long as the political and military leadership of TPLF remains operational,” Metta-Alem Sinishaw, a political analyst on Ethiopia and East Africa, told the Nation.

“The era of political and military dominance of TPLF may be over. However, TPLF still has determined militants, diaspora based radical wings, substantial resources, and exiled members some with strong international tie. It will have a fighting chance for some time, especially if it aligns itself with ethnocentric forces that it cultivated during its heyday,” he added.

Horn region

Considering Tigray’s powerful military, estimated at 250,000 troops, the conflict could be far from over.

Thus, there is a high possibility for the conflict to spill into the Horn region. There are already some signs that the war is attracting other regional actors.

In this respect, Sudan seems to already have become a party to the conflict after Ethiopian forces and the Amhara regional militias entered its territory and ambushed a military unit patrolling inside its own border.

“Sudan has always been ambivalent and may be sympathetic to TPLF.

Egypt may support TPLF either directly or indirectly to destabilise the federal government to undermine its effort on GERD. Also, there are many regional and Gulf actors. Qatar may align with TPLF to counter Abiy’s closeness with UAE,” Metta-Alem said.

Metta-Alem believes Abiy’s “military victory over TPLF” will consolidate the Ethiopian position to continue as a regional security guarantor.

“Despite the new partnership between Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia, there will be a power vacuum In the Horn region, especially in the short run,” he said. 

According to the political analyst, the future of Ethiopia requires serious internal reflection and reconfiguration, including engaging the Tigrayan elites.

East Africa: Oromo Liberation Army Threatens to Block Road Linking Ethiopia to Kenya

15 AUGUST 2021

The Nation (Nairobi)

The main rebel group in Ethiopia’s Oromoa region on Saturday warned that it could cut off a major highway that links Ethiopia to Kenya, in what could directly affect trade with Nairobi.

The Oromo Liberation Army (OLA), a militia group allied with the proscribed Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) said they had mounted an offensive that could block the main highway from Moyale, the only modern border post between Kenya and Ethiopia, which was only launched last December.

If taken over, it will be the first time the conflict in Ethiopia would directly affect Kenya, Ethiopia’s neighbour to the south.

OLA news sources claim that its fighters are rapidly advancing on the western and southern fronts of the Oromia region.

Borena zone

As the OLA fighters pushed deeper to take full control of the Borena zone, the militant group claimed that it has now reached close to cut-off the Ethiopia-Kenya road.

OLA is using blockage of key roads, including those leading to the Amhara region, as its military strategy.

During the last two weeks, OLA reportedly took control and shut down three major supply corridors that link Oromia region with Amhara region, where another rebel group, Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) is battling with government and allied regional forces and militia units.

OLA and TPLF were designated last June as terrorist organisations by the Ethiopian government.

The two rebel groups on Wednesday announced inking a military alliance to overthrow a sitting government in Addis Ababa.

A day later, Addis Ababa downplayed the announced alliance saying it is not a surprise to the Ethiopian government.

Ms Seyoum told journalists that the Ethiopian government is not surprised by the “unusual marriage” of these two “terrorist entities”

She added that the public declaration of alliance by OLF and TPLF means they are also acknowledging of working together towards further destructive activities and again indicates “terrorism is a general feature of both”

Port tariffs

The road has allowed landlocked Ethiopia an additional access to ports. Ethiopia has for decades been highly dependent on neighbouring Djibouti for its maritime trade.

Ethiopia, Africa’s second most populous country with a population of about 115 million people became landlocked after its former province, Eritrea, gained independence in 1993. The Horn of Africa nation has been using the ports of Djibouti for about 95 per cent of its imports and exports.

To ease the huge dependency on Djibouti, Addis Ababa has been looking for other options including via Kenya which eventually enabled the country to be in a better negotiating position on port services in terms of port tariffs.

Construction of the major road corridor was also intended to bring an economic integration between the two neighbours and the region at large.

According to Ethiopian officials, the road further would serve as a crucial outlet for Ethiopia to use the Lamu Port, South Sudan-Ethiopia-Transport (LAPSSET) Corridor.

Kenya rejects UN jurisdiction ahead of Somalia border ruling

The neighbours have been feuding over a stretch of the Indian Ocean that is believed to hold oil and gas deposits.

8 Oct 2021

Al Jazeera

Kenya has said it rejected the jurisdiction of the United Nations International Court of Justice (ICJ) ahead of a ruling next week on its long-running maritime border dispute with Somalia.

The Horn of Africa neighbours have been feuding for years over a stretch of the Indian Ocean claimed by both nations and believed to hold deposits of oil and gas.

“In addition to withdrawing its participation from the current case, Kenya … also joined many other members of the United Nations in withdrawing its recognition of the court’s compulsory jurisdiction,” the foreign ministry said on Friday.

Kenya announced in March that it would boycott ICJ hearings in the case after The Hague-based tribunal refused to allow further delays. The final ruling is due to be delivered on Tuesday.

“The delivery of the judgement will be the culmination of a flawed judicial process that Kenya has had reservations with, and withdrawn from,” the foreign ministry said, accusing the court of “obvious and inherent bias” in resolving the dispute.

“As a sovereign nation, Kenya shall no longer be subjected to an international court or tribunal without its express consent.”

Cases at the ICJ, which rules on disputes between states over international treaties, can last many years.

Failed talks
Somalia, which lies northeast of Kenya, wants to extend its maritime frontier with Kenya along the line of the land border, in a south-easterly direction.

Kenya wants the border to head out to sea in a straight line east – a delineation that would give it a bigger share of the ocean. The disputed triangle of water stretches over an area of more than 100,000 square km (40,000 square miles).

Nairobi maintains it has had sovereignty over the contested zone since 1979.

The two countries agreed in 2009 to settle their dispute through bilateral negotiations.

Two meetings were held in 2014, but little progress was made. A third round of negotiations that same year fell through when the Kenyan delegation failed to show up without informing their counterparts, later citing security concerns.

Somalia took the matter to court in 2014 after saying diplomatic attempts to resolve the disagreement had led nowhere.

But Nairobi – which described itself as “a beacon of peace and stability” in a volatile region – maintained on Friday that it was committed to resolving the dispute through “amicable negotiations”.

Kenya charged that the ICJ had no jurisdiction over the case and its takeover of the arbitration amounted to using pseudo-judicial processes to undermine territorial integrity.

Rocky relations
Next week’s ICJ verdict may further trouble the often rocky relations between the two countries.

Somalia has long bristled at what it calls Kenya’s meddling in regions over its border, while Nairobi has accused Mogadishu of using it as a scapegoat for its own political problems.

Kenya in 2019 recalled its ambassador to Mogadishu after accusing Somalia of selling off oil and gas blocks in the contested area.

It described the move as an “illegal grab” of resources, and reminded Mogadishu of Kenya’s help in the battle against al-Shabab fighters in Somalia.

Kenya is a major contributor of troops to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), which is fighting the al-Qaeda-linked fighters perpetrating violence across Somalia.

Meanwhile, in March last year, Somalia banned the import of khat, a popular mild stimulant plant, from Kenya. Somalia said the ban was to contain the spread of coronavirus, but khat imports from Ethiopia were not stopped.

Moreover, Somalia severed ties in December 2020 after Kenya hosted the leadership of Somaliland, a breakaway state not recognised by Mogadishu.

However, the two countries agreed to reset relations when Somali Prime Minister Mohamed Hussein Roble held talks with Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta in August 2021.

Kenya Upgrades Manda Bay Station As Second Naval Base, Lookout Point

25 SEPTEMBER 2021

The East African (Nairobi)

The upgrading of the Manda Bay station in the north coast of Kenya, into a full military base, is the latest signal by Kenya on just how much it is investing in the security of the new Lamu port and the Lamu Port-South Sudan Ethiopia Transport (Lapsset) corridor and its entire Coastal territory.

The base in Lamu County, will now serve as a co-ordination centre to secure the maritime and land territories.

Nairobi sees Lapsset and Lamu port as a critical national and international investment deserving maximum security.

“Given the growing investments in this part of our country and the promise of the maritime domain, Manda is an invaluable listening and watching tower for Kenya and Kenyans,” President Uhuru Kenyatta said on Thursday at the presentation of Presidential Regiment Colours to the Kenyan Navy in Manda Base.

“We are steadfastly committed to making Boni area a peaceful and stable economic hub. Those infrastructure projects will support the livelihoods of our people within the region,” he said.

Lapsset, a $23 billion project was mooted in 2012 by Kenya, South Sudan and Ethiopia to construct interconnected ports, railways, airports and roads. Lamu port has so far set up the first berth. But the project largely relies on security and commitments by the three countries to see the projects built.

Terrorist cells

Although the government says the Manda Base upgrade is about guarding the border against external attacks, it comes as the International Court of Justice prepares to deliver a judgement in the maritime border case between Somalia and Kenya on October 12.

Mogadishu sued Kenya at the ICJ, seeking to redraw its maritime boundary from Kiunga, just north of Manda.

Manda was also critical in Kenya’s entry into Somalia in pursuit of kidnappers and later terrorist cells and the final onslaught on Kismayu which uprooted al-Shabaab .

President Kenyatta said the naval base is strategically located and has played a critical role defending Kenya’s sovereignty, maintaining territorial integrity, and securing the nation’s maritime borders.

“Today’s exercise of presentation of the Presidential and Regimental colours to Kenya Navy Manda Bay Base will see the installation gain expanded operational autonomy as it sets out to become a more geo-strategic facility for national, regional and global security operations.”

The base was established as a forward operating location under the operational control of Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa and is now the second Kenya Navy Base after Mtongwe.

It has been a multinational task force that combed the Indian Ocean to guard against piracy.

Now the waters are free from pirate attacks after the International Maritime Organisation recently removed Kenya from the piracy red list.

Somalia comes out on top in Kenya sea border judgment

October 12, 2021

AFP

The UN’s top court awarded Somalia control of most of a potentially oil and gas-rich chunk of the Indian Ocean on Tuesday after a bitter legal battle with Kenya over their sea border.

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled there was “no agreed maritime boundary” and drew a new border close to the one claimed by Somalia, although Kenya kept a part of the 100,000 square-kilometre area, chief judge Joan Donoghue said.

Kenya, which had claimed the entire area off the East African coast, said last week that it would refuse to recognise the jurisdiction of the “biased” Hague-based court.

The court’s decision, which is final, could have far-reaching consequences for the future of relations between two key countries in one of the world’s most troubled regions.

Somalia dragged Kenya to the ICJ in 2014 over the disputed patch of sea.

At the heart of the dispute is the direction that the joint maritime boundary should take from the point where the land frontiers meet on the coast.

Somalia insisted the boundary should follow the orientation of its land border and thus head out in a 200 nautical mile line towards the southeast.

But Kenya said its boundary runs in a straight line due east — a delineation that would have given it a big triangular slice of the sea.

The court in the end drew a line passing closer to the boundary claimed by Somalia.

Nairobi says it has exercised sovereignty over the area since 1979, when it proclaimed the limits of its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) — a maritime territory where a state has the right to exploit resources.

The contested 100,000-square-kilometre (38,000-square-mile) area is believed to contain rich gas and oil deposits, and also has important fishing rights.

Nairobi has already granted exploration permits to Italian energy giant ENI but Somalia is contesting the move.

Rulings by the ICJ, which was set up after World War II to resolve disputes between UN member states, are binding and cannot be appealed.

The court has no overt means of enforcing judgments but can refer violations to the United Nations.

Violation of obligations
The ICJ dismissed a claim made by Somalia that Kenya violated its international obligations by exploring minerals at a disputed maritime area in the Indian Ocean.

The court also declined to examine Somalia’s request for reparations over alleged illegal activities by Kenya that occurred after 2009 when the two countries were in negotiations over the dispute.

Further, it also found that Kenya did not interfere with Somalia’s sovereignty and that it cannot be concluded that the activities carried out by Kenya in the disputed area jeopardised or hampered the reaching of a final agreement on the delimitation of the maritime boundary.

Drilling activities
Somalia had complained of certain drilling activities, which it said could lead to permanent physical changes in the marine environment. It argued that such activities may alter the status quo between the parties and could jeopardise or hamper the reaching of a final agreement.

But the court noted that a presentation made in 2011 by a commissioner from Kenya’s Ministry of Energy refers to offshore drilling operations in the Lamu Basin but only lists wells drilled until 2007.

“A map included in the Final Report of the Strategic Environmental and Social Assessment of the Petroleum Sector in Kenya, issued in December 2016 by the Ministry of Energy and Petroleum of Kenya, identifies four wells drilled in the Lamu Basin after 2009, but all of them are located south of and at a great distance from the equidistance line claimed by Somalia as the maritime boundary,” said the judges.

The map does not show any wells drilled after 2009 in the oil concession blocks referred to by Somalia.

Somalia alleged that there was drilling in Block L-22, within the disputed area.

However, two documents issued by a private operator state that “sea core drilling operations were in progress on the L22 offshore license” in 2013 and that “on the offshore L22 license, seabed core drilling operations were carried out in early 2014”.

The judges observed that these documents do not specify the precise location of those operations.

As for the alleged drilling in Block L-5, Somalia failed to provide the court with evidence demonstrating that any such drilling operation ever took place.

“Thus, on the basis of the evidence before it, the Court is not in a position to determine with sufficient certainty that drilling operations that could have led to permanent physical change in the disputed area took place after 2009,” ruled the judges.

Somalia referred to four wells drilled in the offshore Lamu Basin as of 2011, to “sea core” and “seabed core” drilling operations carried out in Block L-22 in 2013 and 2014, and to exploratory drilling in Block L-5 which was “scheduled in 2015”.

On its part, Kenya did not deny having authorised drilling operations in the Lamu Basin, but stated that “there was no drilling of seabed core” in Block L-22 in 2014 and that the drilling scheduled in Block L-5 “never took place”.

The court further noted that, in 2014, the two countries engaged in negotiations on maritime delimitation and that, in 2016, Kenya suspended its activities in the disputed area and offered to enter into provisional arrangements with Somalia.

How Mohamud’s election may boost Kenya-Somalia ties

Thursday, May 19, 2022

Nation Media Group

Hassan Sheikh Mohamud was elected president of Somalia, becoming the first Somali politician to be elected twice to that position, as he led the Horn of Africa nation from 2012-2017.

Relations between Kenya and Somalia had been largely good during Mohamud’s first stint as president, though he was the one who took the maritime dispute between the two countries to the International Court of Justice after much procrastination on the Kenyan side in talks to resolve the issue.

In a recent interview with a Somali online media outlet, Mohamud insisted that Kenya and Somalia are joined at the hip and are inseparable. He also rebuked ultranationalist voices in Somalia who lay claim to parts of northeastern Kenya.

Mohamud election’s, therefore, represents a great opportunity for the two neighbouring countries to reinvigorate their relations, which have been deteriorating in the last few years of outgoing President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo’s reign.

But Kenya and Somalia need to change their attitudes and perceptions towards each other for their relations to improve.

For Kenya, Somalia could represent the biggest business partner among its neighbours, with statistics showing that income from miraa (khat) and other exports could reach KSh60 million a day.

The diplomatic rift between the two countries and subsequent restriction on exports of Kenyan miraa to Mogadishu have reduced income from those exports by more than half.

Also significant is that thousands of Kenyans work in Somalia, mainly as hoteliers and teachers.

Kenya, therefore, needs to stop viewing Somalia only through the lenses of national security and instead start seeing it as a strategic business partner that it should keep.

The Kenyan government also needs to stop treating Mogadishu as the younger and incapable brother it once was during the years of the transitional government. That period elapsed in 2012, and since then Somalia has had a fully fledged and internationally recognised federal government.

Similarly, thousands of Somalis moved to Kenya during the prolonged civil war and some of them are running thriving businesses estimated to be worth billions of shillings. There are also hundreds of thousands of Somali refugees who have lived in Kenya since 1991.

Somalia should also reboot its national priorities and view Kenya as a lucrative business hub for its nationals and a strategic partner that stood by it during the difficult times.

This is the only way the two countries can enjoy a good and lasting partnership regardless of who is in charge in Mogadishu at any given time.